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COMMENT 
JUSTICE FOR RWANDA 
TOWARD A UNIVERSAL LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, an armed conflict raged in Rwanda between a 
non-state party and the Rwandan Government. l This armed 
conflict triggered the attempted extermination of the Tutsi 
ethnic group by the Rwandan Government. As a result of this 
appalling campaign, the United Nations (hereinafter "U.N.") 
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (here-
inafter "ICTR") to prosecute three categories of offenses against 
the law of nations, classified as human-rights violations, com-
mitted during the Rwandan conflict: genocide,2 crimes against 
humanity,3 and violations of humanitarian law.4 Because of the 
1 s.c. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at P2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 
(1994) !hereinafter S.C. Res. 955]. 
2 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, 33 I.L.M 
1602 !hereinafter ICTR Statute], available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHlbasicdocs/statute.html. 
Genocide means "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing 
members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group." Id. 
3 ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 3. 
Crimes against humanity are any of the "following crimes when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, 
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) En-
slavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; <0 Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecu-
tions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts." Id. 
4 Statute of the ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 4. 
427 
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serious nature of genocide and crimes against humanity, inter-
national law applies universally to these crimes regardless of 
where and how they occur.5 For political reasons, however, dif-
ferent standards of humanitarian law apply to crimes commit-
ted during international and non-international armed con-
flicts.6 Crimes committed during international conflicts are 
"war crimes" and are "grave breaches" of humanitarian law.7 
Crimes committed during international conflicts are subject to 
the full extent of humanitarian law, whereas crimes committed 
during non-international conflicts are not "war crimes" and are 
governed by only limited portions of humanitarian law.8 This 
is not because crimes committed during non-international con-
flicts are less serious than war crimes, but because nation-
states are apprehensive of applying strict international stan-
dards to internal wars for fear that it will legitimize rebel 
groups and thereby undermine the exclusive national authority 
of the state over its territory.9 
Violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda constitute "committing or ordering 
to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 
8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to: (a) Violence to 
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well 
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) 
Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced 
prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (0 Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regu-
larly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples; (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts." Id. 
S See generally Statute of the ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 2, 3, Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal, art. 4, 5, 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1195, available at 
http://www.un.org/ictyllegaldocJindex.htm [hereinafter Statute of the ICT¥]. 
6 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, VOLUME 1 207 (Transnational Publishers 1998). 
7 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug. 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, [here-
inafter Geneva Convention I), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7 c4d08d9b287 a42141256739003e636b/fe20c3d903ce27 e3c 12 
5641e004a92£3?OpenDocument. 
81d. 
9 Id. "The fear that the Protocol might affect State sovereignty, prevent gov-
ernments from effectively maintaining law and order within their borders and that it 
might be invoked to justify outside intervention led to the decision of the Diplomatic 
Conference at its fourth session to shorten and simplify the Protocol...[tlhe restrictive 
definition of the material field of application in Article 1 will have the effect that Proto-
col II will be applicable to a smaller range of internal conflicts than Article 3 common 
to the Conventions of 1949." International Committee for the Red Cross, Introduction 
to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
2
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The Rwandan conflict was categorized as a non-
international conflict by the U.N. Security Council; therefore, 
only limited portions of humanitarian law apply.lo Humanitar-
ian law for prosecuting crimes committed during non-
international conflicts is less extensive than humanitarian law 
prosecuting crimes committed during international conflicts.ll 
Accordingly, the judges at both the ICTR and its sister tribu-
nal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (hereinafter "ICTY") have worked to strengthen the laws 
governing internal armed conflicts.12 As a result, the discrep-
ancy of treatment between a non-international and an interna-
tional armed conflict is being steadily eroded. 13 The two tribu-
nals are re-interpreting existing humanitarian law, lessening 
the distinction between internal and international armed con-
flictsY Despite new interpretations of the law, however, codi-
fied customary law continues to apply different standards to 
crimes committed during non-international conflicts and those 
committed during international conflicts. 15 This Comment 




10 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 935, United Nations Commission of Experts'll 108 
[hereinafter "Commission of Experts Report] at S/199411405 (1994). The Commission 
of Experts is a U.N. body responsible for compiling the official report on the situation in 
Rwanda.Id. 
11 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
supra note 6, at 141. 
12Id. 
13 Id; See also, LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT, 51 (Cam-
bridge University Press 2002). 
14 See Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber II (1997) 'II 6.12 (where 
the appellate court held that Common Article Three applies to all armed conflicts re-
gardless of whether non-international or international in nature). Id. 'II 6.13 (where 
the court held that individual criminal responsibility applies in cases of non-
international conflicts despite the lack of specific language in Common Article Three). 
Available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-e.htm. See also Case ICTR-96-4-
2, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber I 'II 615 (where the trial chamber held the 
above jurisprudence of the ICTY to be persuasive on the issue of individual criminal 
responsibility). 
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998, Para 2, sec. (c) - (0, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.183/9 (1998). The Statute 
of the International Criminal Court divides armed conflicts according to whether they 
occurred during international or non-international conflicts_ Id. But see LINDSAY 
MOrn, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT, 166, in which he argues the Statute of 
3
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explores the means whereby the laws of armed conflict may be 
redrafted to incorporate the trend toward the universal treat-
ment of armed conflicts established by the ICTR and the ICTY. 
Section I of this Comment provides a history of the Rwan-
dan armed conflict and a description of the laws of armed con-
flict. It focuses on the basic laws of armed conflict, the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols, and describes how these 
laws have been interpreted by the ICTY and ICTR. 16 Section II 
addresses the classification of the Rwandan armed conflict as a 
non-international conflict. This section discusses Ugandan 
support for the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front ("hereinafter 
RPF") and the murder of ten Belgian U.N. peacekeepers by 
Rwandan troops. The Section proposes changing the definition 
of an international conflict, thereby strengthening the coverage 
of humanitarian law.17 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE RWANDAN ARMED CONFLICT 
Rwanda was a colony of Belgium until 1959.18 During Bel-
gian colonial rule, the Roman Catholic Church and the Belgian 
Government institutionalized ethnic identities in Rwanda, is-
suing every citizen identity cards based on their ethnic groUp.19 
The rationale for establishing ethnicity in Rwanda came from 
assumptions based on a nineteenth-century theory that Tutsis 
were members of a racially superior group called Hamites.20 
The Belgians viewed the Tutsi minority as being ethnically su-
perior to the Hutu majority and a small Tutsi elite was sup-
ported by the Belgian Government and placed in a position of 
the International Criminal Court represents a step toward unification of the laws of 
armed conflicts because of its detailed provisions on internal armed conflicts. [d. 
16 See generally n. 18-96. 
17 See generally n. 97-146. 
18 ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT 
PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE 
SURROUNDING EVENTS [hereinafter OAU Report], 3.1 (2000), at 
http://www.aegistrust.org/sections/reports/contents.asp?fllter=oau. 
19 [d. § 2.10. 
20 PHILIP GoUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 5HPicador 1998). See generally, MAHMOOD MAMDANI, 
WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, Chapter Two (Princeton University Press 2001) (dis-
cussing the application to Rwanda of the theory of Hamitic descent). 
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leadership.21 Although there is little documented evidence of 
any racial difference between people that call themselves 
"Hutu" or "Tutsi," the division became entrenched in Rwandan 
society.22 
After Rwanda gained independence from Belgium, the 
western world and many Hutu politicians saw democracy in 
Rwanda as requiring majority, or Hutu, rule.23 The Hutu, how-
ever, were divided along regional and class lines.24 Attempting 
to unify Hutu people by creating a common enemy, Rwandan 
politicians demonized the Tutsi by characterizing them as 
Hutu oppressors.25 The Western world supported a Hutu-
controlled government, despite the fact that violence against 
the Tutsi increased.26 Between 1959 and 1967, 20,000 Tutsi 
were killed in Rwanda because of their ethnicity, and 300,000 
Tutsi fled the country.27 
During the presidency of Juvenal Habyarimana,28 who 
came to office in 1973, there was a decrease in anti-Tutsi 
propaganda,29 but the Tutsi in Rwanda continued to be 
harassed and treated like second-class citizens.3o As a result, 
Tutsi continued to flee the country during this period, and the 
number of exiled Tutsi in Uganda reached 200,000 by 1970.31 
President Habyarimana claimed that Rwanda was too poor to 
allow the exiles to return.32 
21 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 2.11. 
22 [d. § 2.3. 
23 [d. § 2.12. 
24 [d. § 3.9. 
25 [d. § 3.9, See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 
(Human Rights Watch 1999), Introduction, available at 
http://www.hrw.org!reportsl1999/rwandalGenol-3-01.htm#P6_41. 
26 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 3.14. 
27 [d; See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, The 
Strategy of Ethnic Division, supra note 25. 
28 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY The Strategy of 
Ethnic Division, supra note 25. President Habyarimana, a Hutu, was a member of 
Rwanda's sole political power, the MRND, which was dominated by politicians of the 
Hutu ethnicity. [d. 
29 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 4.2 
30 [d. § 4.1. 
31 [d. § 6.4, see also MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra 
note 20, at 164. 
32 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 6.8. 
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On October 1, 1990, an army of exiled Rwandan Tutsi in-
vaded Rwanda.33 Although Tutsi refugees from Rwanda had 
settled in neighboring Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania, 
the invading army originated almost exclusively in Uganda. 34 
Ill-treated by the Ugandan Government, the displaced Rwan-
dans joined the rebel National Resistance Army (hereinafter 
"NRA"), where they received training in guerilla warfare. The 
NRA, under the control of Yoweri Museveni, took control of 
Uganda in 1986. At that time, Rwandan Tutsi made up almost 
one quarter of the NRA, and many top NRA officers were also 
Rwandan Tutsi.35 After coming to power, President Museveni's 
government came under criticism for being "partial" to Rwan-
dan Tutsi.36 In order to counteract these claims, the new gov-
ernment marginalized Rwandan Tutsi within Uganda. On Oc-
tober 1, 1990, frustrated Tutsi soldiers from the NRA renamed 
themselves the Rwandan Patriotic Front (hereinafter "RPF") 
and invaded Rwanda from Uganda.37 
Despite the fact that there was little evidence of Rwandan 
Tutsi collaborating with the invading army, the Rwandan 
Hutu-controlled government chose to portray the invasion as a 
united effort on the part of all Tutsi to seize control of 
Rwanda.3s Top Rwandan government officials conspired to 
decimate the Tutsi population within Rwanda.39 In April 1994, 
President Habyarimana's plane was shot down en route to the 
capital. 40 The Rwandan government used the assassination as 
an excuse to begin massacres of Tutsi civilians in Rwanda.41 
The day after the president's assassination, plans for the geno-
cide went into operation and the massacres began.42 Jean 
Kambanda, Prime Minister of Rwanda at the time, stated, 
33 [d. § 6.2, See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, 
The Strategy of Ethnic Division, supra note 25. 
34 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 6.l. 
35 [d. § 173. 
36 [d. § 180. 
37 [d. § 6.9. 
38 [d. § 6.22, see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, 
PREPARATIONS FOR SLAUGHTER, supra note 25. 
39 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 14.4. 
40 [d. § 14.1, see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, 
The Attack, supra note 25. 
41 [d; See also OAU Report, supra note 18, § 14.l. 
42 [d. § 14.2. 
6
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"[T]here was in Rwanda in 1994 a widespread and systematic 
attack against the civilian population of Tutsi .... "43 
In recognition of the serious events unfolding in Rwanda, 
the U.N. created a peace-keeping mission for Rwanda in 1993 
called the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (hereinafter 
"UNAMIR").44 UNAMIR solders began arriving in Rwanda in 
February, 1993; one third of the 1,260 UNAMIR solders were 
from Belgium.45 On the day after President Habyarimana's 
plane crashed, Rwandan solders killed ten Belgian UNAMIR 
"Blue Helmets. "46 The Blue Helmets had been sent to guard 
the Prime Minister of Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a mod-
erate leader who was targeted for assassination by Hutu ex-
tremists within the Rwandan government.47 The ten Belgian 
soldiers were originally assisted in their mission by five Ghana-
ian UNAMIR troops, who were separated from the Belgians 
after a rumor spread among the Rwandan troops that the Bel-
gian soldiers were responsible for shooting down the presi-
dent's plane.48 Thus, only the Belgian soldiers were killed.49 
After the murders, Belgium withdrew its troops from the 
UNAMIR mission.50 
In addition to acts of genocide and crimes against human-
ity, those responsible for the genocide are also charged with 
numerous war crimes, such as the murder of civilians not tak-
ing active part in the hostilities and the murder of opposition 
party members for political reasons. 51 One hundred days after 
the genocide began, between 500,000 and one million people, 
43 [d. § 14.4. 
44 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, 194 (Hurst and Company 1995). 
45 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 15.9. 
46 [d. § 15.8. 
47 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, supra note 45, at 230. 
48 COMMISSION D'ENQUETE PARLEMENTAlRE CONCERNANT LES EVENEMENTS DU 
RWANDA, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION D'ENQUETE, 405 [hereinafter Rap-
port Fait au Nom de la Commission d'Enquetel (Senat de Belgique 1997). 
49 RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION D'ENQUETE, supra note 48, at 405. 
50 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 15.9. 
51 See Case ICTR-97-20, Prosecutor v. Semenza, Judgment and Sentence § 535, 
551 (15 May 2003), for an example of the ICTR finding an accused guilty of murder and 
rape as violations of humanitarian law. [d. Semenza was not charged, however, be-
cause of the concurrence of the charges with charges of crimes against humanity. [d. § 
536, 552. For a general description of crimes committed in Rwanda, see generally 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, The Structure, supra note 
25. 
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mostly Tutsi and Hutu opposition party members, were dead.52 
In July 1994, the RPF won the war, took power from the Hutu-
controlled government, and put an end to both the armed con-
flict and the genocide.53 
B. THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICT: THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
Mer the horrors committed during World War II, nation-
states recognized the need for laws regulating armed conflict to 
prohibit future atrocities.54 The Geneva Conventions were 
adopted in 1949 and bind their High Contracting Parties55 to 
customary rules of humanitarian law.56 There are four Geneva 
Conventions, each of which deals with a separate category of 
protected persons: wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, ship-
wrecked sailors and civilians.57 The Geneva Conventions are 
made up of numerous articles, the majority of which deal ex-
clusively with international armed conflicts.58 Only Article 
Three of the Geneva Conventions (hereinafter "Common Article 
52 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 14.2. The exact figure is in dispute. Id. See also 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, Numbers, supra note 25. 
53 Avocats Sans Frontieres, ASF au Rwanda, available at 
http://www.asf.beIFR/Frameset.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). See also HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, The End of Hutu Power, supra note 
25. 
M See generally, International Committee for the Red Cross, Advisory Service on 
International Law, What is International Humanitarian Law? (June 2002) at 
http://www.icrc.org/webleng/siteengO.nsf7htmlaIV57JNXM/$FILElWhat_is_IHL.pdf?Op 
enElement. 
55 A High Contracting Party is a country, or sovereign state, that has signed the 
Geneva Conventions. For a list of signatory parties, see 
http://www.icrc.org/WeblEng/siteengO.nsf7htmV5 7 JMKH?OpenDocument. 
56 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7. See also Geneva Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention 11], available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfl7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/44072487ec4c2131c12 
5641e004a9977?OpenDocument. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention 111], available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfl7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef'854a3517b75ac12 
5641e004age68?OpenDocument. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75, U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] , available at 
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Three"), present in all four conventions, applies to non-
international armed conflicts.59 
The drafters of Common Article Three intentionally lim-
ited its scope in relation to the other articles of the Geneva 
Conventions.60 Common Article Three, therefore, represents a 
"minimum humanitarian standard," guaranteeing only the 
most basic of rights to victims of non-international armed con-
flictsY Those portions of the Geneva Conventions that apply 
only to international armed conflicts are more extensive and 
detailed than Common Article Three.62 The Geneva Conven-
tions marginalize non-international armed conflicts, but many 
serious, non-international armed conflicts have taken place 
since the Geneva Conventions were drafted.63 In recognition 
that Common Article Three is inadequate in light of the large 
number of serious non-international armed conflicts, the major-
ity of U.N. member states adopted Additional Protocol 11.64 
59 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7, Art. 3. See also Geneva Convention II, 
supra note 56, Art. 3, Geneva Convention III, supra note 56, Art. 3, Geneva Convention 
IV, supra note 56, Art. 3. 
60 See International Committee for the Red Cross, Commentary to Article Three, 
Conflicts not of an International Character, 38, Geneva Convention I, (12 August 
1949), available at 
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsfib466ed681ddfcfd241256739003e636811919123eOd 12lfefc 125 
63cd004lfc08?OpenDocument, for examples of the concerns over state sovereignty 
raised during the drafting. Id. The Commentary notes the, "special obstacles arising 
out of the internal politics of the States in which the conflict raged. In a civil war the 
lawful Government, or that which so styles itself, tends to regard its adversaries as 
common criminals." Id. 
61 COMITE II\'TER.."l"ATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE, COMl.\1EI\'TAIRE A LA CO!\TVE!\TTION 
DE GENEVE RELATIVE AU TRAITEMENT DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE, 46 (Jean Pictet, 
ed. 1958). See also LINDSAY Morn, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT at 46. See 
also Prosecutor v. Tadic 'lI 6.12 (where the court interpreted Common Article Three to 
be a minimum standard applying to all armed conflicts: "each of the prohibitions in 
Common Article 3 ... constitute, as the Court put it, 'elementary considerations of hu-
manity.''' See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
14 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icaseslinUS/inusframe.htm. 
62 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7, art. 16, 18. The Geneva Conventions con-
tain many specific provisions that are not enumerated in Common Article Three. Id. 
Many of these provisions expressly criminalize conduct that occurred in Rwanda. Id. 
For example, Art. 16 affords special protection to expectant mothers, who were often 
the target of inhumane treatment during the genocide. Id. Art. 18 specifically exempts 
civilian hospitals from attack, but hospitals were targeted during the genocide as con-
venient places to round up and kill Tutsi. Id; See also, MORRIS & SCHARF, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 6, at 141. 
63 LINDSAY Morn, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT at 1. The Red Cross 
estimates that eighty percent of victims of violence are victims of "non-international 
armed conflicts." Available at www.icrc.org. 
64 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), [herein-
9
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Additional Protocol II was adopted to expand and clarify 
Common Article Three.65 It adds several new provisions to pro-
tect civilians during non-international conflicts.66 Additional 
Protocol II, however, fails to address several important prob-
lems inherent in Common Article Three.67 The same political 
concerns that plagued the drafting of Common Article Three 
were raised by concerned member states during the drafting of 
Additional Protocol 11.68 Specifically, the Protocol fails to ex-
pressly provide for individual criminal responsibility for per-
sons in a position of authority during an armed conflict, nor 
does it criminalize omissions--the failures of persons in author-
ity to prevent crimes being committed under their command.69 
Finally, Additional Protocol II does not explain the difference 
between a non-international and an international armed con-
flict, making it difficult to determine when the Protocol should 
after Additional Protocol II] 8 June 1977, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/d67c3971bcftlc10c125 
641e0052b545?OpenDocument. The member countries also adopted Additional Proto-
col I to update the laws applicable to international armed conflicts. Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol!), !hereinafter Additional Protocol n 8 June 
1977, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/ffic8b9fee14a77fdc125 
641e0052b079?OpenDocument. Rwanda acceded to both protocols. See International 
Committee of the Red Cross, States Parties & Signatories, at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView. 
65 Additional Protocol II, supra note 64, art. 1. For example, Additional Protocol 
II clarifies the meaning of "armed conflict". Id. "Situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
similar nature," are not armed conflicts and are not subject to international law. ld; 
See also LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT at 88. 
66 Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 43, 44. 
67 COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE, COMMENTAIRE DES PROTOCOLES 
ADDITIONNELS, 1358 (Martinus Nijhoff 1986) !hereinafter Commentaire des Protocols 
Additionnelsl. 
68 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 
1977, General introduction to the Commentary on Protocol II, 4394, available at 
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsflb466ed681ddfcfd241256739003e636810f4 7 ae2ffia509689c125 
63cd004399df?OpenDocument. "These debates, which were very intense, revealed a 
tendency to move towards a rather restrictive definition of non-international armed 
conflict which was in danger of no longer being fully in line with common Article 3." 
ld. 
69 Commentaire des Protocoles Additionnels at 1358. In contrast, Additional 
Protocol I (applying exclusively to international conflicts) criminalizes omissions and 
provides for individual criminal responsibility. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, 
art. 86. 
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be applied.70 Despite the improvements of Additional Protocol 
II, important differences still exist between the law of interna-
tional armed conflict and the law of non-international armed 
conflict. 
C. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
Recent jurisprudence from both the ICTY and the ICTR 
strengthens the laws applicable to non-international conflicts.71 
For example, the ICTY, relying on the reasoning of the Nurem-
burg Tribunal,72 has imposed individual criminal responsibility 
for violations of humanitarian law committed during non-
international armed conflicts.73 The ICTR, calling the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY and the Nuremburg Tribunal "persuasive," 
has imposed individual criminal responsibility for violations of 
humanitarian law committed during a non-international con-
flict.74 These and other decisions by the ICTY and ICTR are 
slowly eroding the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts. 
1. The Jurisprudence of the ICTY 
In addition to extending the principle of individual crimi-
nal responsibility to violations of humanitarian law committed 
during non-international conflicts, the ICTY has generated a 
considerable amount of jurisprudence on the difference be-
tween an international and a non-international conflict.75 The 
70 Additional Protocol II, supra note 64. See also The International Committee of 
the Red Cross, General Introduction to the Commentary on Protocol II, (14 Feb. 2002), 
available at 
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsf!b466ed681ddfcfd241256739003e6368/0f4 7 ae2ffia509689c 125 
63cd004399df?OpenDocument. Additional Protocol I, however, drafted to expand the 
application of the Geneva Conventions to international conflicts, defines an interna-
tional conflict as occurring "between two High Contracting Parties," or sovereign 
states. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64. 
71 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
supra note 6, at 141. [d. at 128. 
72 The Nuremburg Tribunal was created to prosecute crimes committed by Ger-
man officials during World War II. See generally 
http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlimtlimt.htm. 
73 Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 1995) § 128. 
74 Case ICTR-96-4-T, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence (2 Sept. 
1998) § 612-615. 
75 Statute for the ICTY, supra note 5. 
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U.N. Security Council found the Yugoslav conflict contained 
both non-international and international elements.76 The ICTY 
statute splits humanitarian law into two parts: Article Two of 
the ICTY Statute includes all of the Geneva Conventions relat-
ing to international conflicts, while Article Three of the statute 
gives the ICTY jurisdiction over Common Article Three and 
Protocol 11.77 It became necessary, therefore, for the ICTY to 
determine which portions of the Yugoslav conflict were non-
international and which were international, in order to apply 
the correct statutory article. 
The ICTY grappled with this problem in several cases.78 
Prosecutor v. Tadic was the first case in which a Trial Chamber 
considered the issue of whether an armed conflict was interna-
tional or non-internationa}.79 The Geneva Conventions state 
that an international conflict occurs between two High Con-
tracting Parties, or sovereign states, but the Tadic Court held 
that an international conflict may also exist when a foreign 
state exercises control over a non-state party to the conflict.80 
In reaching its conclusions, the Tadic Court looked to the 
decisions of other international courts that had interpreted the 
Geneva Conventions in the past.81 In particular, the Court con-
sidered Nicaragua v. United States of America, in which the 
International Court of Justice dealt with a similar issue.s2 
76 See http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireportJar99/eur70.htm for a history of the 
Yugoslav conflict. A single country, Yugoslavia, fractured into several states during 
the course of the conflict. [d. 
77 Statute of the ICTY, supra note 5. 
78 See Prosecutor v Tadic, supra note 14. See also Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., 
Case No. IT-96-21, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14fl available at 
http://www.un.org/icty. In Tadic, the accused was charged with murder, beatings and 
inhumane acts. The accused pled not guilty. See generally Press Release CCIPIO/190-
E, The Verdict (7 May 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/casesljugemindex-
e.htm. 
79 Prosecutor v. Tadic at 112. 
80 [d. at 116. 
81 [d. at 99. 
82 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 61, where 
Nicaragua accused the United States of funding and supporting a rebel military group 
within Nicaragua. [d. 
The Court has taken the view that United States participation, even if preponder-
ant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of 
the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning 
of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself ... for the purpose of attrib-
uting to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their 
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. [d. '11115. 
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Nicaragua required that for a conflict to be deemed interna-
tional, the foreign state must exercise "complete" control over 
the non-state party.83 "Complete" control meant the foreign 
state had to order the non-state party to commit specific acts.54 
The Tadic Court, however, held this level of control to be un-
necessarily high.85 According to the Tadic decision, the foreign 
state need not give "specific instructions" to the non-state 
party.86 The foreign state, however, must still exercise "overall 
control" over the non-state party, helping to plan its military 
campaign and sharing its military objectives.87 
Judge McDonald's dissent in Tadic argued that an even 
lower standard of control should apply to prevent legal techni-
calities from changing the nature of a conflict.88 The Court in 
Prosecutor v. Mucic et al. applied Judge McDonald's reasoning, 
holding the conflict in that case to be international because the 
non-state party, though given a new name, remained under 
foreign-state contro1.89 The "overall control" test continues to 
be the standard used by the ICTY for determining whether Ar-
ticle Two or Article Three of the ICTY Statute should be ap-
plied in a particular case.90 
83 Id.' 
84 Id. 
85 Prosecutor v. Tadic at 157. 
86Id. at 137. 
Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authori-
ties should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their 
targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations 
and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The control re-
quired by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the con-
text of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organizing, coordi-
nating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financ-
ing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group. Id. 
87 Prosecutor v. Tadic at 157. 
[Ilt is not sufficient for the group to be financially or even militarily assisted by a 
State ... In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a 
State, it must be proved that the State wields overall control over the group, not 
only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in 
the general planning of its military activity. Id. 
88 Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, 15 (7 May 1997). 
89 Case IT-96-21, Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., Judgment (16 November 1998) 'II 233. 
See also JOHN R. W. D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRmUNALS, 68 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
90 JOHN R. W. D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS at 55. 
13
Alexander: Justice for Rwanda
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
440 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
2. The Statute of the ICTR 
Article Four of the ICTR statute contains Common Article 
Three and Additional Protocol 11.91 Unlike the ICTY statute, 
the ICTR statute does not include the rest of the Geneva Con-
ventions or Additional Protocol 1.92 The U.N. Security Council 
decided that the conflict in Rwanda was "internal" in nature.93 
The Security Council based its decision on the findings of the 
U.N. Commission of Experts.94 The Commission of Experts con-
ducted a survey of evidence gathered by human-rights organi-
zations in Rwanda and found the armed conflict taking place in 
Rwanda between April 6 and July 15, 1994, to be a non-
international armed conflict because foreign-state involvement 
was limited to "peacemaking and humanitarian functions 
rather than belligerent action. 1195 The courts of the ICTR, 
unlike courts in the ICTY, have never addressed the issue of 
international versus non-international armed conflicts in their 
deliberations.96 
II. ANALYSIS 
It is a fundamental principle of law that similar crimes 
should be punished similarly, yet two sets of rules exist for vio-
lations of humanitarian law. Violations of humanitarian law 
occurring during an international conflict are war crimes, pun-
ishable by an extensive and detailed set of laws. The same 
acts, when committed during a non-international conflict, are 
91 Statute of the ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 4. 
92 Statute ofthe ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 2. 
93 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council 
Resolution 955 (1994) U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 [Hereinafter "Report of the Secretary-
General"). See also Helen Durham, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tri· 
bunals, in THE CHANGING FACE OF CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAw, 199 (Helen Durham & John McCormack, eds., 1999). "Whilst the 
ICTY also has jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war 
crimes, the fact that the Rwandan conflict is not characterized as an international 
conflict has resulted in the exclusion of these two crimes from its Statute." Id. 
94 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 10, 'II 108. See also 
Report of the Secretary-General at 3. 
95 Final Report of the Commission of Experts 'II 108. The speedy creation of the 
ICTR, "limited opportunities for lengthy debate on much of the legal technicalities." 
Helen Durham, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, supra note 91, 
at 198. 
96 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 14, 'II 601. 
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not war crimes and are subject to a lesser body of law. The cir-
cumstances surrounding a violation of humanitarian law, 
rather than the nature of the violation, determine the type of 
law to be applied. While basic humanitarian standards are 
upheld in Common Article Three and Additional Protocol II, a 
comparison of these instruments with the other Geneva Con-
vention articles and Additional Protocol I cannot help but ex-
pose the marginalization of non-international conflicts. 
Two points emerge from this analysis. First, as armed con-
flicts are often very complex, and the law applied to a conflict is 
determined by its nature, every aspect of a particular conflict 
must be thoroughly examined before the conflict can be catego-
rized as international or non-international. If a non-
international armed conflict could be reclassified as an interna-
tional armed conflict, it should be so reclassified to obtain the 
full protection of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Pro-
tocols. The "overall control" test was developed by the ICTY to 
differentiate between international and internal armed con-
flicts occurring in the former Yugoslavia, but it could prove a 
useful tool in determining the nature of other complex armed 
conflicts. Is the Rwandan armed conflict, for example, actually 
international in nature? . Is it, instead, a conflict made up of 
both international and non-international parts? 
Second, the international community must work toward 
abolishing the distinction between the laws regulating interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts. Humanitarian 
law should apply with equal force to international and non-
international armed conflicts. The applicability of humanitar-
ian law to a particular act should not depend upon abstruse 
and technical distinctions between types of conflicts. Unfortu-
nately, even if portions of the Rwandan armed conflict can be 
reclassified as international, much of the Rwandan armed con-
flict, the Yugoslav conflict, and, indeed, armed conflicts world-
wide remain internal affairs, outside the scope of most humani-
tarian law. 
A. APPLYING THE "OVERALL CONTROL" TEST TO RWANDA 
Nothing like the "overall control" test created by the ICTY 
has been developed by the ICTR because the U.N. Security 
15
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Council and the U.N. Commission of Experts categorized the 
Rwandan conflict as non-internationa1.97 Two aspects of the 
Rwandan armed conflict, however, are potentially international 
in nature. The first is Ugandan financing and support for the 
RPF invasion. The second is the murder of ten Belgian peace-
keepers by Rwandan troops. 
1. Invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
The RPF invasion is usually seen as the armed return of 
Tutsi refugees to Rwanda, but scholars have also pointed out 
that regional developments played a key role in sparking the 
Rwandan armed conflict.98 The RPF, while not openly sup-
ported by President Museveni of Uganda, had his tacit support 
and received material aid from the Ugandan government.99 To 
what extent the Ugandan Government supported, or even con-
trolled, the RPF is debatable. President Museveni knew of the 
impending RPF attack on Rwanda, though not the exact date 
or circumstances under which it was to take place.101 President 
Museveni allowed the RPF to use weapons they had been given 
97 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 10, 'II 108. 
98 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 20, at 159. 
99 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 20, at 183. 
Years later, President Museveni told his fellow regional heads of state meeting in 
Harare that, while the [Rwandan Tutsi] in the NRA had informed him in advance 
'of their intention to organize to regain their rights in Rwanda,' they had launched 
the invasion 'without prior consultation.' Significantly, he continued, even though 
'faced with [a] fait accompli situation by our Rwandan brothers,' Uganda decided 
'to help the [RPF], materially, so that they are not defeated because that would 
have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been 
good for Uganda's stability.' It was as candid an admission of complicity as any 
head of state could have made. [d. 
100 [d. "Years later, President Museveni told his fellow regional heads of state 
meeting in Harare that, while the [Rwandan Tutsi] in the NRA had informed him in 
advance 'of their intention to organize to regain their rights in Rwanda,' they had 
launched the invasion 'without prior consultation.' Significantly, he continued, even 
though 'faced with [a] fait accompli situation by our Rwandan brothers,' Uganda de-
cided 'to help the [RPF], materially, so that they are not defeated because that would 
have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been good for 
Uganda's stability.' It was as candid an admission of complicity as any head of state 
could have made." MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 
18, at 183. 
101 [d. 
102 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 42, at 97 (Hurst and 
Company 1995). 
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when serving as Ugandan solders. 103 The RPF invaded 
Rwanda with equipment from Uganda, including machine-
guns, rocket-launchers, rifles, and other equipment. l05 The 
Ugandan government, however, put up roadblocks to prevent 
more NRA solders from deserting to join the RPF.106 Later in 
the war, Museveni allowed the RPF to reenter Uganda to re-
group and the RPF continued to receive arms from Uganda 
throughout the war.107 The level of Ugandan involvement in 
the RPF invasion is still a matter of debate and the armed con-
flict can be seen either as a foreign invasion or a civil war. lOB 
The Rwandan government raised the issue of Ugandan 
support of the RPF before the Security CounciLl09 In Prosecutor 
v. Akayesu, the court cited to the U.N. Security Council's char-
acterization of the Rwandan conflict, which stated that it was 
non-internationaL 110 In a later case, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 
the court stated only that due to the evidence presented by sev-
eral expert witnesses, the conflict in Rwanda was a non-
international conflict between the then-existing government of 
Rwanda and "dissident forces."lll Was the involvement of the 
Ugandan government enough to qualify the RPF invasion as an 
international conflict? 
The "overall control" test, outlined in Tadic, is as follows: 
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary 
group to a State, it must be proved that the State wields 
overall control over the group, not only by equipping and fi-
103 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 97. 
104 OAP Report, supra note 16, Chapter 6 
105 Id at 93. 
106 Id. at 94. 
107 Id at 115. 
108 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 20, at 160. 
The answer is complex, but it seems that the two extreme positions, namely the official 
Ugandan line ('our good faith was surprised by cunning conspirators') and the Kigali 
propaganda line ('this is a planned invasion supported by the Ugandan government .. .') 
are both untenable. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 97. 
109 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
supra note 6, at 142 n.602. 
110 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 14, 'II 604. Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), U.N. Doc. 
811995/134 at 3. 
m Case ICTR-96-3, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 435, Trial Chamber I (1999), avail-
able at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm. 
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nancing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the 
general planning of its military activity.ll2 
There is evidence that the RPF was financed and equipped 
by the Ugandan government, but did the Ugandan government 
coordinate or plan the military activity of the RPF? To a cer-
tain extent, the Ugandan government wanted the Rwandan 
refugees to return to Rwanda. 113 Yet, a general desire that the 
Tutsi return to Rwanda and turning a blind eye to the organi-
zation and training of troops from its army are not the same as 
the Ugandan government actively participating in planning an 
invasion of Rwanda. Under the "overall control" test as defined 
in Tadic, it is unlikely Ugandan involvement in the RPF inva-
sion would rise to the level of "overall control" needed to render 
the armed conflict international in nature. 
Was the RPF, like the Serbian troops in Mucic et al., 
merely part of the Ugandan army under a different name?114 
The RPF troops were Ugandan troops under a new name, but 
the change of name cannot be called a ruse by the Ugandan 
government to avoid complicity in the invasion. The formation 
of the RPF was accomplished by a rogue group within the 
Ugandan army. The Ugandan leadership did not actively par-
ticipate in forming the RPF. What is lacking in the relation-
ship between Uganda and the RPF is the element of willful or 
intentional involvement in the RPF invasion by the Ugandan 
government. 
Even if the conflict in Rwanda cannot be classified as a 
conflict between two sovereign states, the U.N. itself found that 
the conflict caused instability in the region. ll5 If a conflict oc-
curring within one country affects neighboring countries, is the 
conflict international? The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor u. 
Kanyabashi concluded that a non-international conflict may 
have international repercussions, but that these repercussions 
112 Supra note 87. 
113 Supra note 99. 
114 Prosecutor v Mucic et ai, supra note 78, 'lI 233. The Trial Chamber held that 
changing the name of the Government controlled group was an intentional attempt to, 
"mask the continued involvement of the [Government troops] in the conflict while its 
Government remained in fact the controlling force .... " [d. 'lI 234. 
115 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
supra note 6, at 112, n.506. 
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do not make the conflict international. ll6 It is the causes of a 
conflict, and not its effects, that determine its nature. It can be 
seen from this analysis that in order for a conflict to be interna-
tional, two Sovereign States must intentionally involve them-
selves in that conflict. 
2. The Murder ofTen Belgian Solders from the U.N. Assis-
tance Mission in Rwanda 
Why does the involvement of U.N. troops in Rwanda, who 
are clearly under the control of a sovereign, foreign body, not 
render portions of the Rwandan conflict international? Ten 
Belgian UNAMIR solders were killed protecting the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda. U7 Unlike the RPF, the U.N. peacekeepers 
were clearly under the command and control of a foreign body, 
the U.N. In Prosecutor v. Bagasora,ll8 the murders were tried 
as violations of Common Article Three and Additional Protocol 
II of the Geneva Conventions, but questions were raised on be-
half of the government of Belgium as to whether the murders 
were actually an international incident. ll9 It can be argued 
that an international conflict occurred between UNAMIR, a 
fighting force controlled by the U.N., and Rwandan troops.120 
The issue then becomes whether peacekeepers can be party to 
an armed conflict. A legal expert, Eric David, filed a brief on 
behalf of the Kingdom of Belgium that outlines both sides of 
the argument.l21 
David begins with the argument that the killing of the ten 
Belgian solders was one event during the course of a non-
international armed conflict, stating that this conclusion is 
supported by both fact and law.122 First, David points out that 
116 Case ICTR-96-15-T, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 'II 19 (Trial Chamber Decision 
on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction) 18 June 1997. The court held, "[T]he conflict in 
Rwanda as well as the stream of refugees had created a highly volatile situation in 
some of the neighboring regions." [d. 
117 Supra note 46. 
118 Bagosora is charged with ordering the murder of the UNAMIR troops and of 
Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. Case ICTR-96-7, Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Indictment 
(1998) 'II 1.24. 
119 Intervention de la Belgique au titre d'Amicus Curiae en l'afT. Bagosora n° 
ICTR-96-7 -T [hereinafter "Amicus Curiae brief"]. 
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both Rwanda and UNAMIR were parties to all the Geneva 
Conventions and both Additional Protocols.123 This could be 
interpreted to mean the two parties considered an eventual 
conflict taking place between themselves to be potentially ei-
ther non-international or internationaU24 
David then looks to the facts, finding that only the Belgian 
forces, and not the Ghanaian soldiers, were attacked by Rwan-
dan troops.125 David says one could draw the conclusion that 
the Belgian troops were attacked because they were Belgian 
and not because they were representatives of the U.N.126 The 
U.N. itself was not attacked, therefore, it was not a party to the 
conflict. There are two problems with this theory. Firstly, 
other motives for the killings have been suggested. For exam-
ple, the Belgian troops may have been targeted precisely be-
cause they were U.N. peacekeepers, because the Rwandan gov-
ernment wanted Belgium to withdraw its troops from Rwanda, 
crippling the peacekeeping effort.127 Secondly, even if David's 
interpretation of the event is correct, the motives behind the 
killings do not change the fact that U.N. troops were killed in 
the course of performing their duties. The motive behind the 
killings is not relevant in determining whether the incident 
was international in nature. 
David does not actually provide an argument in favor of 
finding the Rwandan conflict to be international. Instead, he 
focuses on the fact that UNAMIR was signatory to all of the 
Geneva Conventions and both Additional Protocols, explaining 
that Common Article Three is a minimum standard applicable 
to both non-international and international conflicts. 128 David 
notes that regardless of the nature of the conflict, the U.N. in-
tended to apply at least the minimum standard of humanitar-
ian law.130 




127 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 229. 
128 Amicus Curiae brief, supra note 119, at 15. David quotes to sources arguing in 
favor of finding Common Article Three applicable to all armed conflicts. [d; See also 
supra note 61. 
129 Amicus Curiae brief, supra note 114, at 15. David quotes to sources arguing in 
favor of finding Common Article Three applicable to all armed conflicts. [d. See also 
supra note 50. 
130 Amicus Curiae brief, supra note 119, at 21. 
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What are the arguments in favor of finding that an inter-
national conflict existed in Rwanda? The issue in this case is 
whether a peacekeeping force can be party to an armed conflict. 
A "party to a conflict" must be an aggressor in that conflict and 
peacekeepers are not aggressors. l3l If peacekeepers are not a 
party to a conflict, their involvement cannot be used to qualify 
the conflict as international. In its official report on the mur-
ders, the Belgian Senate states that the soldiers were involved 
in a "peacekeeping" mission. 132 The peacekeepers were de-
ployed to protect the prime minister from harm. 133 UNAMIR 
was not an aggressor in the conflict but merely observed and 
maintained the peace. Indeed, one of the biggest criticisms of 
UNAMIR is that it remained completely disengaged from the 
conflict taking place around it. 134 
It is clear from the above analysis that an international 
conflict must involve either two state parties, or a state party 
and a fighting force that is both an aggressor in the conflict and 
under the control of a sovereign foreign body. Neither the RPF 
invasion nor the UNAMIR killings meet both these criteria. 
The Rwandan armed conflict does not fall within the current 
definition of an international conflict. The majority of human i-
tarian law cannot be applied to many serious crimes committed 
during the Rwandan armed conflict. 
B. REDRAFTING THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Codified international law, such as the Geneva Conven-
tions and Additional Protocols, treats differently violations of 
humanitarian law committed during international conflicts and 
131 The U.N. defines peacekeeping as "a means by which the international com-
munity can encourage the establishment of sustainable peace in places and situations 
where conflict threatens or has been recently subdued." At 
http://www.un.org/Deptsldpko/dpkolques.htm. See also GARTH J. CARTLEDGE, LEGAL 
CONSTRAINTS ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 128 (1999), reprinted in HELEN DURHAM 
AND TIMOTHY L.H. McCORMACK, THE CHANGING FACE OF CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw, (Martinus Nijoff 1999), in which the author 
states, "the Geneva Conventions themselves cannot be said to apply to a peacekeeping 
operation unless there is an actual armed conflict applicable to the United Nations 
forces themselves. Peacekeepers are not normally engaged in armed conflict.. .. " [d. 
132 Rapport de la Commission d'enquete parlementaire concernant les evenements 
du Rwanda, Senat de Belgique, Session de 1997-1998,6 Decembre 1997 at 403. 
133 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 230. 
134 See generally, GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, Chapter 
6. 
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those committed during non-international conflicts. Any such 
distinction is artificial, because similar humanitarian viola-
tions occur during international and non-international con-
flicts. The Rwandan armed conflict is an example of the seri-
ous non-international conflicts existing in the world today. 
Such conflicts deserve to be treated under more than a "mini-
mum humanitarian standard." International courts, such as 
the ICTY and ICTR, are moving away from treating differently 
non-international and international armed conflicts. Treating 
international and non-international armed conflicts with dif-
ferent rules is confusing and serves no purpose in the effective 
application of the law. The existence of two separate bodies of 
law is, essentially, a political creation that has little legal justi-
fication. 135 Humanitarian law should be redrafted to create a 
single body of law that applies to all armed conflicts. 
The "overall control" test, developed by the ICTY, has 
proved useful in the classification of armed conflicts.13G The test 
requires that the causes of an armed conflict be international, 
because an international conflict is defined in the Geneva Con-
ventions and Additional Protocols as a conflict "between High 
Contracting Parties."137 Only when two High Contracting Par-
ties cause a conflict will that conflict be classified as interna-
tional. The "overall control" test excludes many of today's 
armed conflicts, because many conflicts do not involve two High 
Contracting Parties. Despite the involvement of only one High 
Contracting Party, many of these conflicts have a considerable 
effect on neighboring countries.13S Rwanda is an example of 
such a conflict.139 
135 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
supra note 6, at 207. 
136 Supra note 90. 
137 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7. 
138 Commission of Experts 'lI 109. For example, the influx of Rwandan refugees 
(many of whom were involved in the genocide) has added to the instability of the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Developments, Zaire 
(1994), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/19951WR95/AFRICA-ll.htm#P581_209577. "The 
security situation in the refugee camps in Goma, Zaire became increasingly volatile by 
the end of 1994 due to the activities of former Rwandan army troops and militia mem-
bers, most of whom were still armed .... " [d. The Rwandan armed conflict has had an 
effect on other neighbors, such as Burundi. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights 
Developments, Burundi (1994), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reportsl19951WR95/AFRICA-02.htm#P87_30999. "The influx of 
thousands of Rwandan refugees after the genocide began in their country in early April 
heightened tensions, particularly in those parts of northern Burundi near the frontier." 
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Many important armed conflicts occurring in the world to-
day are made up of a complex mixture of international and 
non-international conflicts.14o The nature of potential foreign-
state involvement is often difficult to quantify.141 Equally diffi-
cult to discern is the intentions of the foreign government re-
garding the armed conflict.142 The level of foreign-state in-
volvement in many such conflicts does not rise to the threshold 
of international involvement. 143 Nonetheless, many of these 
conflicts have unquestionably had a serious effect on neighbor-
ing states.144 The regional effects of many non-international 
armed conflicts are easily observable and widely documented. 
[d; See also Human Rights Watch, Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Si-
lencing Protest (May 2000), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reportsl2000/drc/Drc005.htm#TopOfPage. "The Interahamwe, 
originally a Rwandan Hutu militia which helped lead the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 
now include the remnants of that group plus others, both Rwandan and Congolese 
Hutu, who have joined with them in fighting the current government of Rwanda." [d. 
139 Supra note 138. 
140 See generally Human Rights Watch, Overview of Human Rights Develop-
ments, Angola, 2002, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2001, and Liberia 2003, available 
at http://hrw.org/docf?t=africa, for examples of other complex African "civil wars." [d. 
In particular, the recently concluded "civil war" in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
[hereinafter "DRC") contains many international aspects that have yet to be fully ex-
plored. See Human Rights Watch, D.R. Congo: U.N. Must Address Corporate Role in 
War (October 27,2003), available at http://hrw.org/pressl2003/10/drc102703.htm. 
Since August 1998, the DRC has been enmeshed in one of Africa's most wide-
spread wars, directly involving six other countries. The armies of Rwanda, 
Uganda and Burundi along with Congolese rebel groups were pitted against the 
DRC government, supported by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Under increas-
ing international pressure, the bulk of the foreign armies have withdrawn from 
Congo in the past year but they left behind many vested interests and a network 
of economic ties. Illicit economic exploitation reportedly continues through armed 
groups linked to neighboring countries and corrupt government officials. [d. 
141 For example, the armed conflict in the DRC involves both the direct and indi-
rect involvement of Angola, Zimbabwe and Rwanda. A blurred line exists between 
criminal groups exploiting the conflict and armed forces ensuring regional stability. 
See generally Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of N atu-
ral Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (16 
October 2002) [hereinafter "Panel Report on the DRC"), S/200211146, § 13 - 17, avail-
able at http://www.uni-gruppe.de/deutsch/psfeb03/documents/s2002.pdf. 
142 For example, the Rwandan government argues its troops in the DRC serve a 
peacekeeping function, while the Commission of Experts accuses the Rwandan gov-
ernment of plunder. Panel Report on the DRC § 65, 66. 
143 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7, Preamble, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf77c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/fe2Oc3d903ce27e3c12 
5641e004a92f3?OpenDocument. 
144 Supra note 138. Acknowledging the interrelatedness of armed conflicts 
throughout central Africa, the U.N. is working toward a "Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region." Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of 
the Security-Council mission to Central Africa, S/2004152 (January, 20 2004) § 55. 
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Regional conflicts, or conflicts having a serious and docu-
mented effect on neighboring states, should be categorized as 
international conflicts because of their international conse-
quences. Additional Protocol I would then cover both conflicts 
occurring between sovereign states and conflicts having a seri-
ous and document regional effect. Additional Protocols I and II 
would, in effect, be merged to create a new Protocol applying to 
all serious armed conflictS.145 State sovereignty would be en-
sured by retaining the language of Additional Protocol II, 
which excludes "situations of internal disturbances and ten-
sions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature." 146 This language excludes 
purely internal incidents that do not effect neighboring states. 
Were a new definition of international armed conflicts adopted, 
all serious armed conflicts would be equally covered by interna-
tional law. No longer would the nature of an armed conflict 
determine the applicable law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Currently, different sets of laws exist for violations of hu-
manitarian law committed during non-international conflicts 
and for those committed during international conflicts. Identi-
cal crimes are treated to different sets of laws, depending upon 
the nature of the conflict during which the crimes took place. A 
change in the definition of an international conflict is required 
to do away with this discriminatory treatment. The Rwandan 
armed conflict is not classified as an international conflict un-
der the current definition. The Rwandan conflict, however, like 
many serious conflicts involving non-state parties, affects the 
stability of the entire region surrounding Rwanda. Neverthe-
less, the Rwandan armed conflict is covered by only the bare 
minimum of humanitarian law. The Additional Protocols 
145 Supra note 64. See also THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, THE 
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw AND FuNDAMENTAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICTS IN WHICH NON-STATE ENTITIES ARE PARTIES, (The Insti-
tute of International Law 1999). "Therefore it is desirable and necessary that States, 
the United Nations and competent regional and other international organiza-
tions ... draft and adopt a convention designed to regulate all armed conflicts and protect 
all victims, regardless of whether such conflicts are international, non-international or 
ofa mixed character." [d. 
146 See Additional Protocol II, supra note 64, art. 1. 
147 See Additional Protocol II, supra note 62, art. 1. 
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should be merged into one Protocol, covering not only armed 
conflicts taking place between two High Contracting Parties, 
but also armed conflicts involving only one High Contracting 
Party but having a serious effect on neighboring states. All 
serious armed conflicts would be covered by the full extent of 
humanitarian law. 
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